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Developments in European Competition
Policy: How EC Merger Regulation
No. 4064/89 Prevents German Law
from Blocking Large Cross-Border
Concentrations
I. INTRODUCTION
The treatment of takeovers and mergers has been one of the most
debated areas of European competition law.' These forms of business
concentration involve a change in corporate structure. 2 For example,
Company A may acquire Company B as a subsidiary, or Company A
may assume all of the assets and liabilities of Company B.
Mergers generally fall into one of three categories, each having a
different influence on market competition. A horizontal merger in-
volves concentration of firms that sell similar products in the same
geographic location. 3 In a vertical merger, a company requiring a cer-
tain item for production will acquire its supplier.4 The third category,
conglomerate merger, occurs between companies that either produce
complementary products, 5 similar products distributed in different ge-
ographical markets,6 or completely unrelated products.7
During the 1980s, the business world witnessed a surge in merger
activities. According to William Staple, the director of NM
1. NICHOLAS GREEN ET AL., THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE SINGLE EUROPEAN
MARKET 276 (Trevor C. Hartley ed., 1991). "Merger" in this Comment refers to both total
integration mergers and partial mergers (i.e., concentrative joint ventures).
2. Id.
3. James A. Lamberth, Note, A Comparison of Merger Control Laws in West Germany
and the United States, 21 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 251, 252 (1987). Horizontal
mergers are given close scrutiny by regulators because they involve concentrations in an indus-
try that may have detrimental effects upon market entry and competition among existing firms.
Id. See SIR LEON BRITTAN, COMPETITION POLICY AND MERGER CONTROL IN THE SINGLE
EUROPEAN MARKET 38 (1991).
4. Lamberth, supra note 3, at 252. Such mergers have a tendency to be anticompetitive
because, by dominating supplies of important raw goods, competing firms find it difficult to
enter the production market. Id.
5. Id. Such mergers are referred to as "product extension mergers." Id.
6. Id. Such mergers are referred to as "market extension mergers." Id.
7. Id. These are "pure conglomerate mergers." Conglomerate mergers may be an-
ticompetitive because they remove firms from the market. This may lead to higher prices and
decreased consumer choice. Id.
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Rothchild & Sons, four factors accounted for this explosion. The pri-
mary factor was the interest of companies to dispose of peripheral
activities and establish concentrated control in core businesses.8 Sec-
ond, the deregulation of financial markets made capital readily avail-
able.9 Small firms with minimal cash were thus able to raise
enormous sums through high-yield corporate bonds ("junk bonds"). 10
Third, competition and free trade became increasingly liberal, making
inefficient companies desirable targets of takeover bids. I I Finally,
companies sought to establish themselves in key markets.12 Instead of
traditional organic growth, they preferred mergers with existing
companies. 1
3
While hostile takeovers and leveraged buyouts proliferated in
both the United States and the United Kingdom, German companies
remained committed to traditional corporate growth. 14 Germans do
not share the Anglo-American entrepreneurial tradition of buying
and selling companies.' 5 Additionally, protectionist German univer-
sal banks have kept a tight leash on companies to discourage foreign
takeovers. 16
The German merger environment should change drastically in
the 1990s. Germany's recent reunification has increased its impor-
tance in the world marketplace. 17 In this time of internationalization
of markets, foreign investors rely on the importance of international
mergers to remain competitive in Europe. 8 For United States com-
panies, mergers with German firms will provide opportunities to par-
ticipate in the development of the European Community ("EC") and
the growing Eastern European markets. 19
8. William Staple, M&A in the 1990s, INT'L M&A, 1992, at 3.
9. Id.
10. Id. In 1985, merger transactions increased in value to an all-time high of almost $180
billion, 47% higher than the previous record breaking year. Additionally, the number of an-
nounced mergers rose from 2543 in 1984 to 3001 in 1985. See 50 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep.
(BNA) No. 1257, at 492-93 (Mar. 20, 1986).
11. Staple, supra note 8, at 3.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See Dr. Paul Achleitner, Why Germans are Shedding Their Inhibitions About Anglo-
Saxon M&A, M&A EUR., Apr. 1991, at 19.
15. Id.
16. LESTER THUROW, HEAD TO HEAD 135 (1991).
17. Achleitner, supra note 14, at 19.
18. See Karlheinz Quack, Merger Control in Germany: A Comment, in INTERNATIONAL
MERGERS & JOINT VENTURES 202-04 (Barry Hawk ed., 1990); Kurt E. Markert, German
Antitrust Law and the Internationalization of Markets, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 897, 897 (1988).
19. Achleitner, supra note 14, at 19.
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These changes in the German environment have raised new legal
issues. During the 1980s, investors structuring a German merger had
to comply with the detailed and stringent German merger control
laws. Today, the same transaction may be governed by the 1989 EC
merger control regulation. In some respects, this law affords more
favorable treatment to large mergers.20 Therefore, in this new envi-
ronment, businesses contemplating mergers with German companies
must understand the European legal structure and be able to control
the variables of a merger in order to take advantage of the EC law's
benefits.
This Comment is primarily designed to aid practitioners inter-
ested in cross-border mergers involving German companies. It will
begin by exploring the background and history of European mergers.
Next, this Comment will explore the law governing mergers with Ger-
man companies prior to the 1989 EC merger control law. Then it will
explain the provisions of the EC merger control law and its effect on
mergers in Europe, specifically in Germany. Finally, this Comment
will suggest a structure for a merger with a German company that
takes advantage of the benefits of the new legal environment. This
Comment will conclude that the new law, coupled with EC economic
policies, encourages large mergers in Germany which were not previ-
ously feasible.
II. OVERVIEW OF EUROPEAN MERGERS
This section of the Comment briefly discusses the development of
the European Community. Next, it traces the history of mergers dur-
ing the 1980s. Finally, this section highlights the need for a compre-
hensive merger control law to facilitate the EC's goals of fostering
competition and efficiency.
The Treaty of Rome ("Treaty") established the European Com-
munity on January 1, 1958.21 The Treaty vested regulatory power in
20. Quack, supra note 18, at 204.
[T]he rather liberal EEC rules, which exclude the application of stricter national
regulations, could have the result that the larger mergers will pass the European test
and the smaller ones will be prohibited by Germany's Federal Cartel Office in ac-
cordance with the old, pessimistic German saying: "The little guys will be hung, the
big ones will always get away!" Id.
21. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY [EEC TREATY],
Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11. Hansjurgen Herrmann, EEC Merger Regulation: One Year
After, in 14TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE FOR CORPORATE COUNSEL: DOING BUSINESS AND IN-
VESTING ABROAD 1991, at 301, 302 (PLI Corp. Law and Practice Course Handbook Series
No. 752, 1990).
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the EC Commission ("Commission") and eliminated tariffs between
European nations. 22 Originally, there were six Member States:
France, Italy, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg;
in 1986, the Single European Act increased the number to twelve,
adding the United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark, Spain, Portugal, and
Greece.
23
If the EC successfully creates a barrier-free single market with
the European Free Trade Association, eighteen nations and 375 mil-
lion consumers will unite in a common market on July 1, 1993.24 In
anticipation of the new liberal trade structure, the wave of mergers
experienced in the United States is spreading to Europe.25 In 1987,
the Commission reported that European mergers surged from twenty-
nine in 1983-1984 to fifty-two in 1985-1986.26 "The reason for that
state of affairs included the relatively smaller size of Community com-
panies, the existence of 12 fragmented markets and industry's conse-
quent inability to achieve the necessary economies of scale in research
and development and production .... ,"27 The Commission has par-
ticular interest in encouraging mergers in industries where there is
overcapacity or significant domination by United States and Japanese
companies.28 Due to the importance of these mergers to the EC, their
competitive effects must be evaluated by a Community-wide
standard.
2 9
In the Treaty of Rome, the EC expressed its goal of full eco-
22. Joel Davidow, Competition Policy, Merger Control and the European Community's
1992 Program, 29 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 11, 11 (1991).
23. See Markert, supra note 18, at 897.
24. Bruce Barnard, EC to Restart Talks Next Week on 18-Nation Single Market, J. COM.,
Jan. 27, 1993, at A3. See generally ROGER BROAD & ROBERT JARRETT, COMMUNITY Eu-
ROPE: A SHORT GUIDE TO THE COMMON MARKET 85-87 (1968).
25. See Achleitner, supra note 14, at 19. See also Ingo L. 0. Schmidt, The Bigness Mys-
tique and the Merger Policy Debate: A Comment from West Germany, 9 Nw. J. INT'L L. &
Bus. 618, 622 (1989).
26. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, SIXTEENTH REPORT ON COMPETI-
TION POLICY 218 (1987).
27. CLIFFORD CHANCE, THE CCH GUIDE TO 1993: CHANGES IN EEC LAW 14 (1990).
See also Lamberth, supra note 3, at 252 (supporting the view that most mergers are desirable
and efficient). In highly concentrated industries, controlling firms have the power to exclude
others. Anticompetitive mergers may lead to increased prices, excess profits, and limited con-
sumer choice. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
MERGER POLICIES AND RECENT TRENDS IN MERGERS 7 (1984).
28. See CHANCE, supra note 27.
29. GREEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 200. BRITTAN, supra note 3, at 43.
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nomic integration of its Member States. 30 In order to achieve this
goal, free and fair competition must be preserved. Therefore, Articles
3, 85, and 86 of the Treaty mandate that corporate enterprises avoid
non-competitive business practices3' and prohibit "restriction or dis-
tortion of competition within the Common Market.
'32
Individual national authorities, each with their own approaches,
have provided insufficient regulation.33 Realizing these difficulties,
the Council of the Ministers of the European Communities adopted
Regulation No. 4064/89 ("Merger Control Regulation"). 34 The
Merger Control Regulation, effective September 21, 1990, gives the
Commission exclusive jurisdiction over large scale mergers. 35 How-
ever, many Member States are reluctant to surrender antitrust power
once reserved for the sovereign states to a multinational body.36 Ger-
many is particularly fearful of transferring such power to the EC.37
In 1973, the German government passed one of the most comprehen-
sive and wide reaching merger control laws, but it has now lost exclu-
sive jurisdiction over large mergers to the new Merger Control
Regulation. 38
III. MERGERS IN GERMANY UNDER THE GWB
This section of the Comment outlines the merger environment in
Germany from World War II to the present. Next, it discusses Ger-
30. See generally Derek Prag, The Treaty of Rome, in THE COMMON MARKET: THE
TREATY OF ROME EXPLAINED (J. Calman ed., 1967).
31. EEC TREATY arts. 3, 85, 86. Restricted practices include: price fixing; limits and
controls on production; imposing dissimilar conditions upon equivalent transactions with simi-
larly situated trading parties; and imposing upon trading parties obligations that are unrelated
to the underlying transaction. Id.
32. Id. art. 85.
33. Diane Price, The EEC and Cross Border Mergers, 132 SOLIC. J. 1412, 1412 (1988).
34. Council Regulation 4064/89 on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertak-
ings, 1989-90 O.J. (L 257/13) [hereinafter Merger Control Regulation].
35. DROSTE KILLIus TRIEBEL, BUSINESS LAW GUIDE TO GERMANY 1016 (3d ed.
1991). Large scale mergers are those where the preceding year's worldwide turnover of all
undertakings exceeded ECU 5 billion; a Community-wide turnover of no less than two under-
takings exceeded ECU 250 million. Id. See infra notes 154-56 and accompanying text.
36. Michael J. Reynolds, Merger Control in the EEC, 17 J. WORLD TRADE L. 407, 422
(1983). "Some member states (Germany, Denmark and the Benelux countries) are in favor of
a purely consultative Committee with the final decision resting with the Commission." Id.
(emphasis added).
37. Dr. Martin Hirsch, Member State Merger Law and Policy in the Wake of the EEC
Regulation - A German View, in EUROPEAN/AMERICAN ANTITRUST & TRADE LAW, at 27-
1, -2 (Barry Hawk ed., 1988). "German governments have in the past resisted all endeavors to
adopt an EEC regulation on merger control." Id. at 27-2.
38. Id. at 27-1, -2.
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many's growing need for merger control in the 1970s and 1980s. The
remainder of this section analyzes the details of the German merger
control law.
A. History of Mergers and the Need for Control in Germany
Following the end of World War II, the Allied powers made
strong efforts to decentralize West German industry. 39 These struc-
tural reorganizations helped to bolster the nation's economic perform-
ance.40 Germany went from a nation of bureaucratic giants to one of
efficient and manageable firms.
However, in 1967, the German government showed its lingering
affinity for "big business" when it announced: "Larger markets de-
mand in many ways larger and more efficient company units ....
The Federal government is concerned to remove obstacles which
stand in the way of concentration of enterprises... so that the devel-
opment of firms of optimum size will not be hindered. ' 41
This view was consistent with the 1960s idea that "merger-in-
duced bigness promotes international competition, efficiency, and
technological progress."' 42 These sentiments spurned an increase in
merger activity.43
While German merger activity increased during the 1970s and
1980s,44 the nation did not experience the merger explosion felt in
other European countries, such as France and the United Kingdom,
and the United States. 45 Traditionally, the German speaking world
has not shared the Anglo-Saxon practice of buying and selling compa-
nies, but rather favored organic growth. 46 Therefore, Germany did
not explicitly regulate corporate mergers and acquisitions in the
past.47 Instead, it was "a widely accepted position in the German
39. Walter Adams & James W. Brock, The Bigness Mystique and the Merger Policy De-
bate: An International Perspective, 9 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 1, 34 (1988).
40. Big Won't Work; Small Should Mean More Technological, ECONOMIST, Dec. 25,
1976, at 60, 61.
41. George H. Kuster, Germany, in BIG BUSINESS AND THE STATE: CHANGING RELA-
TIONS IN WESTERN EUROPE 64, 79 (Raymond Vernon ed., 1974).
42. Schmidt, supra note 25, at 618.
43. Adams & Brock, supra note 39, at 34. The number of mergers performed from 1969
to 1970 exceeded the total of the previous decade. Id.
44. Schmidt, supra note 25, at 619.
45. See Adams & Brock, supra note 39, at 34.
46. Achleitner, supra note 14, at 19. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
47. DR. DIETER BIENERT, CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS AND MERGERS IN GERMANY 19
(1991). See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
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business community that ... competition is sufficiently protected by
the Antitrust Act and any other interests are adequately taken care of
by voluntary compliance with non-binding guidelines. ' '48 Practition-
ers should note that the harmonization efforts of the EC Commission
are likely to disrupt this flexible system in favor of a more detailed
regulatory framework. 49
B. Structural Merger Defense
Even without substantive merger regulation, German companies
have managed to prevent threatening acquisitions.50 They have used
two primary structural defense mechanisms. First, German compa-
nies traditionally rely upon debt rather than equity to finance
growth. 51 Thus, there are few publicly held corporations, 52 and the
banking system controls more than two-thirds of the one hundred
largest firms. 53 Second, publicly traded German corporations have
defended themselves by limiting shareholders' voting rights5 4 and by
restricting transfer of interests. 55 A German company's articles of as-
sociation or partnership agreement may provide that a transfer of in-
terest requires the consent of the management, shareholders, or
partners. 56 Together, these methods have effectively warded off large-
scale takeovers by foreign investors and hostile parties. 57
With the recent reunification, speculation and investment in Ger-
many have greatly increased. 58 Since small, undercapitalized compa-
48. BIENERT, supra note 47, at 19. Such guidelines include the "Guidelines on Voluntary
Public Tender Offers," the "Insider Trader Rules," and the "Dealer and Advisor Rules." Id.
49. Id.
50. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
51. Achleitner, supra note 14, at 19.
52. In September 1992, there were only 2682 German stock corporations compared with
almost 400,000 limited liability companies (non-marketable shares can only be transferred by
notarial deed). Of the 2682 stock corporations, approximately 500 have their shares traded on
the German stock exchange. See Christian Broderson & Walter Henle, Germany, INT'L
M&A, 1992, at 3.
53. Leonard P. Feldman, German Reunification: The Effect on International Joint Ven-
tures, 5 FLA. J. INT'L L. 271, 276 (1990) (Bank officers provide strategic direction and sit on
the boards of German companies). See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
54. Broderson & Henle, supra note 52, at 48. Generally, German corporations do not
permit common stock owners to vote unless their holdings exceed five-percent of aggregate
capital. Id. See BIENERT, supra note 47, at 21.
55. Broderson & Henle, supra note 52, at 48 (German insurance companies often use this
restriction).
56. BEINERT, supra note 47, at 21.
57. Id.
58. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
1993] 1035
Loy. L.A. Int7 & Comp. L.J
nies are now vulnerable to take-overs by larger, more liquid
conglomerates, Germany needs laws that allow enough freedom for
efficient market competition while still restricting corporate raiding.
C. Addition of German Merger Control Law
Germany first added merger control provisions to its antitrust
law (known as the Law Against Restraints on Competition, or Gesetz
gegen Wettbewerbsbeschriinkungen ("GWB")5 9) in 1973. 60 The
GWB was subsequently amended, most recently in 1990.61 The pri-
mary emphases of previous amendments were: more stringent merger
controls;62 improved supervision of concentrations to prevent an-
ticompetitive abuses by "market dominating enterprises; '63 and the
overall goal of preserving efficient competition.64 The resulting regu-
lation has been applauded as one of the most extensive and sophisti-
cated statutory schemes in its domain.
65
Practitioners involved in a cross-border merger governed by the
GWB must understand its scope and procedural requirements.
Where the language is vague, the GWB's underlying policies, as evi-
denced by the subsequent amendments, provide additional insight.
1. "Merger" Defined Under GWB
The merger control provisions in the GWB apply to "mergers"
between "enterprises," including acquisitions of assets or "shares,"
and the formation of "joint ventures."' 66 The term "enterprise" is
read broadly to include all individuals, partnerships, companies, cor-
59. Act Against Restraints of Competition, Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschriinkungen/
GWB [BGBI.I], reprinted in Schonfelder No. 74, at 2294. See generally DR. ALEXANDER
RIESENKAMPFF, LAW AGAINST RESTRAINTS OF COMPETITION: TEXT AND COMMENTARY
IN GERMAN AND ENGLISH (1977).
60. Patrick J. Roach, Review of Foreign Merger and Acquisition Laws: West German Ac-
quisition and Merger Controls, 52 ANTrrruST L.J. 1007, 1007 (1983).
61. See DROSTE KILLIUS TRIEBEL, supra note 35, 1015; Dr. Martin Heidenhain, Anti-
trust Law: Merger Control, in BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS IN GERMANY § 36.011] (Dr. Bernd
Riister ed., 1992). In 1990, the German Economics Minister announced that foreign small and
medium-sized firms could own more than 50% of East German companies. Large companies,
however, were still restricted to 49% ownership. Changes to East German Joint Venture Law
Elicit Approval, Skepticism in West Germany, 7 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 5, at 166 (Jan.
31, 1990).
62. JOCHIM SEDEMUND, Germany: Federal Republic, The Impact of Recent Amendments
to German Cartel Law, in INTERNATIONAL ANTI-TRUST: NATIONAL LAWS 66 (1981).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Roach, supra note 60, at 1007.
66. See Heidenhain, supra note 61, § 36.01[2].
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porations, and other entities engaged in business activities. 67
"Shares" encompass all interests or participations in corporations,
companies, or other enterprises.
68
Therefore, a "merger" under the GWB may include: the acquisi-
tion of the assets of another enterprise;69 the acquisition of the shares
in another enterprise;70 certain agreements by which an enterprise
gains control over another;71 or any other affiliation between enter-
prises where one entity dominates another.72
This broad language gives German officials control over most
transactions involving the transfer of interest in business organiza-
tions. It further emphasizes the importance of understanding the de-
tails of the GWB in order to achieve the most beneficial treatment.
2. Notification Requirements Under GWB
If a transaction qualifies as a merger, the GWB requires notifica-
tion of the Federal Cartel Office ("FCO"). 73 This notification require-
ment enables the FCO to review prospective mergers in order to
prevent possible anticompetitive effects in advance.74
a. Procedural Requirements
The GWB requires merging parties to notify the FCO prior to
67. Id. "Architects, auditors, lawyers, physicians and other professionals as well as sci-
entific, artistic and athletic organisations or associations, therefore constitute enterprises to the
extent that they are engaged in business activities." Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. This requires acquisition of all or a substantial part of another enterprise's assets
(emphasis added). Id.
70. Id.
According to the 1973 Amendment, the acquisition of shares in another enterprise
constituted a merger only if the shares acquired equal 25 percent of more of the
voting capital of another enterprise. Following attempts to circumvent the 25 per-
cent threshold, the 1980 Amendment provided that the acquisition of less than 25
percent of the voting capital of an enterprise constitutes a merger, provided the ac-
quiring enterprise is granted by agreement, articles of association or otherwise addi-
tional minority rights. Moreover, the 1990 Amendment provided that the
acquisition of a minority interest also constitutes a merger of the acquiring enterprise
without being granted additional minority rights may directly or indirectly exercise a
"significant competitive influence" on the other enterprise. These Amendments have
rendered the 25 percent threshold almost obsolete.
Id.
71. Id. For example, an arrangement where an enterprise does not acquire another but
rather establishes control over or receives profits from another enterprise. Id.
72. BEINERT, supra note 47, at 29-30.
73. Lamberth, supra note 3, at 254.
74. Id.
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commencement of the merger if one of the enterprises participating in
the transaction achieved a turnover of at least DM two billion in the
previous business year;75 or if at least two of the participating enter-
prises each achieved a turnover of at least DM one billion in the last
completed business year;7 6 or if the merger is to be effected by legisla-
tion or any other governmental act. 77
If prior notification is required, the parties must have FCO ap-
proval before completing the merger. 78 Therefore, practitioners
should try to structure transactions to avoid compulsory prior notifi-
cation and unnecessary delay. Even where prior notification is not
required, practitioners may consider notifying the FCO in order to
expedite the post-merger notification and clearance process. 79 Re-
gardless of whether parties choose voluntary or mandatory pre-notifi-
cation, every merger where the enterprises have combined sales of
DM 500 million in the preceding fiscal year requires notification with-
out undue delay after its completion.80
b. Required Contents of Notification
One relief to practitioners is that the requirements of GWB noti-
fication are not particularly stringent. The first requirement of the
notification is a list of the enterprises involved in the merger and an
identification of the form of the merger.8' Second, each participant
must disclose its identity and market share.82 Although not required,
75. Jurgen Lindemann, Merger Control in Germany, in BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS
FOR WORKOUT OFFICERS AND LENDERS COUNSEL 1990, at 283, 285 (PLI Comm. Law and
Practice Course Handbook Series No. 547, 1990).
76. Id.
77. Heidenhain, supra note 61, § 36.01[3][c]. Lamberth, supra note 3, at 254.
78. Lindemann, supra note 75, at 285. If the FCO notifies the parties within one month,
it has up to one year from the date of notification to prohibit a merger. Failure to notify results
in the FCO's waiving its rights to prohibit merging. Heidenhain, supra note 61, § 36.01[3][c].
79. "Mergers not falling under the prior notification duty shall be notified without undue
delay after consummation. These mergers may, however, be notified prior to consummation
and prior notification may be advisable because the term for decision by the FCO in case of
prior notification is much shorter than in case of notification after the consummation; also
prior notification avoids the risk that a merger already completed has to be dissolved." Id.
80. See Heidenhain, supra note 61, § 36.01[3]; BEINERT, supra note 47, at 31.
81. Lindemann, supra note 75, at 285. This may be asset purchase, stock purchase, or
other agreement.
82. The following data must be supplied:
a) the name of the enterprise, its registered office and the type of business (summary
account of the range of products and services);
b) the turnover achieved during the last completed business year preceding the
merger or notification;
c) the market shares in the German domestic market including the basis of their
1038 [Vol. 15:1029
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participants are advised to provide further information regarding the
effects of the merger on the relevant markets.83
Because the GWB does not specify a filing format, practitioners
have considerable latitude in drafting notifications. This leaves room
for inclusion of persuasive data, particularly regarding voluntary
information.
3. Standard of FCO Review
The FCO prohibits mergers that will allow companies to
strengthen a "market-dominating position. ' 84 It will allow a merger,
however, if it will lead to "improvements in the conditions for compe-
tition ... [that] will outweigh the disadvantages of market domina-
tion." 85 This latter provision is referred to as the "balance-clause.
'8 6
Unfortunately, the FCO and the courts rarely accept the balance
clause argument.
87
While the GWB itself does not contain specific standards to eval-
uate a merger, it does include certain guidelines and presumptions
which aid the FCO.88 For example, under the GWB, an enterprise
has a dominant market position if it:
calculation or estimate (Section 23 subsection five requires only market shares of 20
percent or more to be listed but at least for the product markets affected by the
merger, it is advisable to give detailed information also, if market shares are less than
20 percent).
Id.
83. Such information may include market shares of the main competitors, technical and
price competition, barriers to market entry in the industry, potential effects on competition,
and effects on demand. Id. at 286.
84. See Heidenhain, supra note 61, § 36.01(4].
85. Kurt E. Markert, Merger Control in Germany: Substantive Aspects, in INTERNA-
TIONAL MERGERS AND JOINT VENTURES 149-50 (Barry Hawk ed., 1990).
86. "The clause is essentially a test that seeks to balance the anticompetitive effects of a
merger measured in terms of market domination against possible procompetitive effects of the
same merger on other markets." Id. at 150.
87. "It is indeed almost impossible to persuade the FCO and the courts to accept a
merger which leads to a market dominating position or which strengthens an existing one by
arguing that improvements in the conditions of competition will outweigh the disadvantages of
the market domination." Quack, supra note 18, at 202.
During the more than 17 years since the introduction of merger control in Germany,
only very few attempts to save anticompetitive mergers by trying to bring the "bal-
ance-clause" into play have been successful. As the burden for proving sufficiently
strong procompetitive effects is fully on the participating firms, the chances of per-
suading the Cartel Office or the courts to accept a market dominating merger by
application of the "balance-clause" are minimal.
Markert, supra note 85, at 150.
88. See Heidenhain, supra note 61, § 36.01[4][a].
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- is without competitors or encounters no substantial competi-
tion or
- has a superior market position in relation to its competitors
(criteria are: its market share, its financial strength, its access
to supply and sales markets, relationship with other enter-
prises, legal or factual barriers to the entry of other enterprises
into the market).
8 9
The FCO presumes that a merger would create a market-dominating
position if:
- an enterprise has a market share of at least one-third for a
specific kind of goods or commercial services, 9°
- three or fewer enterprises together have a market share of fifty
percent or more, or
- five or fewer enterprises together have a market share of two-
thirds or more. 91
The FCO gives participating enterprises an opportunity to rebut
these presumptions. 92 However, if the FCO's findings do not conclu-
sively show whether or not the merger participants hold a market-
dominating position, it will assume that such a position exists. 93 Prac-
titioners must follow the FCO procedure and should persuasively
present the relevant data in order to show that the proposed merger is
consistent with the German market.94
4. German Law and Foreign Mergers
One of the most powerful aspects of the GWB is its application
to foreign mergers. Under the "effects doctrine," the GWB governs
all restraints on competition which impact the German domestic mar-
ket.95 The FCO, in its Guidelines on Domestic Effects of Foreign
Mergers, stated that it will assume that a foreign merger will influence
the German market when the participating enterprises have been do-
89. Lindemann, supra note 75, at 286.
90. This is referred to as the "presumption of monopoly." "The presumption of monop-
oly applies only if the enterprise concerned and its affiliates had during the last fiscal year
preceding the merger worldwide consolidated sales of DM 250 million or more." Heidenhain,
supra note 61, § 36.0114][d][i].
91. Lindemann, supra note 75, at 287. The final presumption is referred to as the pre-
sumption of oligopoly. "The presumptions of oligopoly apply only if the enterprise concerned
had during such period worldwide consolidated sales of DM 100 million or more."
Heidenhain, supra note 61, at § 36.01[4][d][i].
92. Heidenhain, supra note 61, § 36.01[4][d].
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. § 36.01[8].
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ing business domestically through subsidiaries, branches, or
imports.
96
The FCO has the power to prohibit and dissolve foreign mergers
to the extent that they create or strengthen a dominant market posi-
tion within Germany. 97 In 1980, the FCO exercised its authority to
prohibit two mergers performed abroad which it deemed strengthened
a dominant market position. The first transaction involved a German
company's acquisition of shares in a British corporation.98 In the sec-
ond case, a foreign subsidiary of a German company sought to ac-
quire a French production facility. 99 In 1982, the FCO prohibited the
transfer of stock in a British corporation from a South African com-
pany to a United States company because it determined that the for-
eign merger consolidated German subsidiaries, creating a dominant
market position. °°
The FCO has intervened in a number of subsequent foreign
mergers. Recently, the FCO prohibited a merger between Philip
Morris and Rothmans Tobacco because both companies had German
subsidiaries.10' Germany has justified such wide-reaching regulation
on the basis that the consolidation of enterprises outside of Germany
may strengthen a dominant market position within the nation. How-
ever, this may be an abuse of the FCO's power.10 2 As a result, compa-
nies around the globe may avoid merging with German entities for
fear that the FCO may retroactively prohibit a completed
concentration.
96. RUDOLF MUELLER ET AL., GERMAN ANTITRUST LAW 392 (3d ed. 1984).
97. Note that the FCO does not have the power under the Law of Nations to prohibit
and dissolve mergers in their entirety but only their "effects" on the domestic market. See
Heidenhain, supra note 61, § 36.01[8].
98. WuW/E BKartA 1875 (RUckspiegelglAser, decided May 27, 1980). Deutsche
Uhrenglasfabrik acquired the shares of Eurotech Mirrors Int'l.
99. WuW/E BKartA 1937 (Bayer/Firestone, decided Sept. 23, 1980). Bayer France, a
subsidiary of Bayer AG, planned to acquire a Firestone production facility (including machin-
ery, patents, stocks, customer lists, etc.). The FCO prohibited the merger, claiming that the
increase of the market share, the increase in production capability, and the elimination of a
competitor strengthened Bayer AG's market-dominating position. The Court of Appeals later
overruled the decision. Court of Appeals, WuW/E OLG 2411, Synthetischer Kautschuk I
(1980).
100. WuW/E BKartA 1943 (Philip Morris/Rembrandt, decided Feb. 24, 1982).
101. Lindemann, supra note 75, at 283.
102. See id.
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C. Observations of the GWB and the Need for a
Community- Wide Standard
Practitioners should be aware of several characteristics of the
GWB when planning a merger. First, the language of the statute con-
centrates on the structure of the enterprises rather than their con-
duct.'0 3 Second, the FCO has generally adhered to the GWB's
structure and it has not rigidly applied the various presumptions. °4
Third, if a party to a horizontal merger already dominates a particu-
lar market, the concentration will most likely be prohibited on a "per
se" basis.'0 5 Fourth, the FCO merger review standard applies to for-
eign mergers to the extent that they create or strengthen a dominant
market position within Germany.' °6 Finally, because of the GWB's
broad definition of a "merger," the same FCO standard of review ap-
plies to concentrated joint ventures. 10 7
Practitioners should also be aware that GWB's scope appears to
be quite broad. Those anticipating a merger in Europe may have to
evaluate its effects upon German competition even if the concentra-
tion does not involve a German company. For those who are merging
with German companies, the size of the transaction may govern its
treatment by the FCO. As discussed above, the GWB's broad pre-
sumptions discourage large scale mergers. 08
It appears that the GWB's provisions and the FCO's application
may be overly stringent for non-German companies. This may dis-
courage cross-border mergers by prohibiting the development of more
efficient economies of scale, adversely affecting the citizens and econo-
mies of the EC. Thus, it seems that, instead of reaching across the
borders of other nations, a Community-wide standard would be more
predictable and efficient.
103. Markert, supra note 85, at 154-55. This is most patently seen in the pre-merger notifi-
cation market share and other financial thresholds. Id. See supra notes 75-79 and accompany-
ing text.
104. Id. at 155-56. "[A] systematic analysis of all relevant cases until 1986 showed that in
less than ten percent of these cases the presumption was not regarded as having been rebut-
ted." Id. See supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
105. Id. at 157. Such an enterprise may only argue the "balance-clause" which, as dis-
cussed, is virtually never successful. Id. See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
106. Id. at 157. "Applying domestic merger law to international and foreign mergers not
only requires special care in view of possible conflicts with foreign governments, but also illus-
trates in particular the need to include international competition into the merger reviewing
process." Id. at 158. See supra notes 95-102 and accompanying text.
107. Id. at 158. "[S]uch cases are most likely to arise where one of the parents already has
a dominant position and the joint venture is closely related to the dominated market." Id.
108. See supra notes 88-93 and accompanying text.
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III. EC MERGER CONTROL LAW
This section of the Comment will begin by tracing the develop-
ment of EC merger controls under the Treaty of Rome. Next, it will
show why the Community could not rely on the Treaty to accomplish
its economic goals and instead created a comprehensive regulation.
Finally, this section will present the EC Merger Control Regulation
and will analyze its interplay with the GWB.
During the early years of its power, the EC Commission read the
Treaty of Rome strictly. °9 The Commission stated in a 1966 memo-
randum that Article 85, dealing with restrictive trade agreements,
should not apply to mergers.110 The primary reason for this decision
was that most acquisitions, such as hostile takeovers, are effected
through tender offers rather than by official agreement. Therefore,
the Commission felt that extending the power of Article 85 to stock
transactions would create inconsistent and inequitable results."'1
The Commission recognized early that Article 86 restricted
mergers which constitute an "abuse of a dominant position."'1 2 The
European Court of Justice, however, did not confirm this position un-
109. See COMMISSION COMPETITION SERIES No. 3, THE PROBLEM OF INDUSTRIAL CON-
CENTRATION IN THE COMMON MARKET (1966). See also Mario Siragusa & Dirk
Vandermeersch, EC Merger Control: An Introduction, in MERGERS AND JOINT VENTURE AC-
TIVITIES IN THE EEC: A GUIDE TO DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE NEW REGULATIONS 13,
13 (1990).
110. Id. Article 85 states:
The following shall be deemed to be incompatible with the Common Market and
shall hereby be prohibited: any agreements between enterprises, any decisions by as-
sociations of enterprises and any concerted practices which are likely to affect trade
between the Member States and which have as their object or result the prevention,
restriction or distortion of competition within the Common Market, in particular
those consisting in:
(a) the direct or indirect fixing of purchase or selling prices or of any other trading
conditions;
(b) the limitation or control of production, markets, technical development or
investment;
(c) market-sharing or the sharing of sources of supply;
(d) the application to parties to transactions of unequal terms in respect of
equivalent supplies, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage ....
EEC TREATY art. 85.
111. FRANK L. FINE, MERGERS AND JOINT VENTURES IN EUROPE: THE LAW AND POL-
ICY OF THE EEC 6 (1989). The Commission occasionally applied Article 85 to mergers when
it recognized agreements that would threaten Community competition. See COMMISSION OF
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, FOURTEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 81-83
(1985); Cases 142/84 & 156/84 British Am. Tobacco Co., Ltd. & R.J. Reynolds Indus. Inc. v.
Commission, 1987 E.C.R. 4487 [1986-88] Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,405 (1987); William
Dawkins & Lisa Wood, EC Forces Changes in Irish Bid Battle, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 18, 1989, at
19.
112. Article 86 states:
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til 1973 in the Continental Can judgment. 113 In Continental Can, the
Court found:
[Article 86] applies not only to practices that may cause a direct
prejudice to consumers but also to those that cause a prejudice to
consumers through interference in the structure of actual competi-
tion .... There may therefore be abusive behavior if an undertak-
ing in a dominant position strengthens that dominant position so
that the degree of control achieved substantially obstructs
competition. 1
4
Some authors have argued that the Court's interpretation of the
Treaty is an inadequate basis for merger control." 5 They claim that
"not every merger which adversely affects the structure of competi-
tion within the Community and affects trade between member states,
involves undertakings which are or thereby become dominant within
the meaning of Article 86."'116 The EC included Article 86 in the
Treaty to guard against abuse of, and not merely the existence of,
To the extent to which trade between any Member States may be affected
thereby, action by one or more enterprises to take improper advantage of a dominant
position within the Common Market or within a substantial part of it shall be
deemed to be incompatible with the Common Market and shall hereby be prohibited.
Such improper practices may, in particular, consist in:
(a) the direct or indirect imposition of any inequitable purchase or selling
prices or of any other inequitable trading conditions;
(b) the limitation of production, markets or technical development to the prej-
udice of consumers;
(c) the application to parties to transactions of unequal terms in respect of
equivalent supplies, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; or
(d) the subjecting of the conclusion of a contract to the acceptance, by a party
of additional supplies which, either by their nature or according to commercial us-
age, have no connection with the subject of such contract.
EEC TREATY art. 86.
113. Pierre Raoul-Duval & Gide Loyrette Nouel, The EEC Merger Control Regulation,
C356 A.L.I. 455 (1990); Case 6-72 Europemballage Corp. & Continental Can Co. v. Commis-
sion, 19 E.C.R. 215, [1971-73 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8171 (1973).
114. Continental Can Co. v. Commission, 1973 C.J. COMM. E. REC. 215, reprinted in
(1971-73 Transfer Binder) Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8171, 9481 (1973) (emphasis added).
In this case, the Continental Can Company, a New York manufacturer of packaging products,
sought to purchase a controlling interest in its Netherlands-based licensee. Because Continen-
tal Can had gained control of a German packaging company the previous year, the Commis-
sion determined that Continental already had a dominant position in the Common Market and
disallowed the merger. The European Court of Justice overruled the Commission's order ter-
minating the merger but upheld the use of Article 86 as a basis for dissolving concentrations
that create a market dominating position. Id.
115. Christopher Sherliker, Merger Regulation in the EEC, 134 NEw L.J. 809, 809 (1984).
116. Id. Article 86 provides inadequate merger control for three reasons. First, it does
not apply to the creation of a market dominating position, but only to increases in pre-existing
dominant positions. Second, there are no protections for mergers which are desirable in total-
ity but violate the Article's terms. Third, Article 86 can only remedy and cannot prevent the
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market power. 1'7 For example, virtual control of an entire market for
a product does not constitute a violation, but abuse of such a control-
ling position by unfairly establishing prices to injure and discourage
competition is a violation. 18 Therefore, under Article 86, it makes
more sense for the Commission to allow mergers, and then monitor
the conduct of the new enterprise."19
A. Need for Community-Wide Merger Control
As discussed, the Court of Justice modified the applicability of
the Treaty of Rome to mergers during the 1970s and 1980s.120 This
left considerable gaps in the law, which limited the Commission's
power to regulate. 12 1 Instead of judicially forcing merger control
under the Treaty of Rome, the Commission advocated and finally
passed a comprehensive EC Merger Regulation.
During the 1970s, the Commission urged the Member States to
authorize Community-wide merger control. 22 The Commission felt
that such a regulation would increase the efficiency of antitrust en-
forcement in the EC.123 Smaller Member States were in favor of such
a law. 124 They "accepted the logic of a Community merger control as
a consequence of the combination of the already existing competition
rules with the progress towards an Internal Market in terms of the
1992-Program."'' 25 On the other hand, larger nations with their own
merger regulations, such as Germany, were reluctant to surrender
power to the Commission. 26
The Directorate General ("Directorate") of the EC argued that
the success of the 1992-Program was directly related to an effective
harmful effects of an undesirable concentration. See Alec Burnside, Merger Control With a
European Dimension - The Draft Regulation, 16 INT'L Bus. LAW. 349 (1988).
117. See generally EEC TREATY.
118. See generally Reynolds, supra note 36.
119. Id.
120. See generally Raoul-Duval & Nouel, supra note 113.
121. Id. at 455-56. See supra notes 109-18 and accompanying text.
122. See 2 BARRY E. HAWK, UNITED STATES, COMMON MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL
ANTITRUST 664-65 (2d ed. 1990).
123. Marttijn van Empel, Merger Control in the EEC, 13 WORLD COMP. L. & ECON. 5, 6-
7 (1990).
124. Id. at 7.
125. Id. The "1992-Program" is the movement towards a more complete common market
named after the year-end target date for the single European Market. Davidow, supra note 22,
at 14-15.
126. Id. at 7-8.
19931 1045
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J[
EC merger control policy. 127 The Directorate supported its position
by showing that European companies engaged in far too few merg-
ers.128 This small number was due in large part to strict national
laws, like Germany's, which hindered or prevented acquisition by
foreigners. 1
29
One key objective of the EC is to revise European corporate law
and preempt restrictive national regulations in order to stimulate for-
eign investment.1 30 The Commission has argued that deregulation in
the common market would lead to large trans-European acquisitions,
mergers, and joint ventures.13 1 The Commission has also conceded,
however, that this approach will lead to some anti-competitive trans-
actions, which should be reviewed at the EC level.
132
The Commission seemed to be walking the line between strong
antitrust controls and a liberal trade structure. Those favoring rigid
antitrust regulation feared giant, anti-competitive Anglo-Saxon style
mergers. 133 If unchecked, such activity could undermine the purpose
of the EC, which is to create an efficient and diverse market. 34 These
advocates were primarily from the smaller Member States which did
not have detailed merger control provisions.1 35 Germany, with per-
haps the most detailed regulation, did not share these concerns.
136
The Commission hoped that the Regulation would appeal to
firms and Member States by providing "legal certainty" and "one-
stop shopping."' 37 "Legal certainty" means that once the Commis-
sion decides that a merger conforms with the control provisions, it
assures the parties that the transaction will not be retroactively chal-
lenged.1 38 German law does not promise this; rather, under the
127. See Completing the Internal Market: White Paper from the Commission to the Euro-
pean Council, COM(85)310 final at 134, 143-44, 157-58.
128. See Frank L. Fine, EEC Merger Control in the 1990s: An Overview of the Draft Regu-
lation, 9 Nw. J. INT'L Bus. 513 (1989).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, EIGHTEENTH REPORT ON
COMPETITION POLICY 245 (1987).
132. See generally id. The Commission considered national regulation inadequate because
not all Member States had sufficient competition policy. Id.
133. Davidow, supra note 22, at 11.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Larger nations with detailed regulations opposed the regulation because the control
of mergers was considered an important aspect of national autonomy that should not be gov-
erned by the EC. Id. at 16.
137. Davidow, supra note 22, at 26.
138. Id.
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GWB, the FCO has up to one year to invalidate a transaction. 39
"One-stop shopping," based on the doctrine of supremacy, gives
the Commission exclusive jurisdiction over very large, transnational
mergers.' 40 This provision eliminates the Member States' rights to
review or challenge a merger within the scope of the regulation.
14'
Such a system is favorable for foreign enterprises desiring to merge
with German companies. Instead of complying with strict, protec-
tionist German law, they could file exclusively with the EC
Commission. 142
In 1973, the Commission submitted the Regulation for the Mem-
ber States' consideration. The critics identified three primary
problems: (1) the Regulation's low monetary threshold; 43 (2) the pos-
sibilities of long delays by the Commission in merger approval;'" and
(3) excessive supremacy over national law and policy. 45 Because of
these objections, the members did not approve the Regulation. 46 Un-
derstanding the importance of merger control to the EC, the Commis-
sion made a series of compromises over the years to make the
Regulation palatable. 47
B. Merger Control Regulation No. 4064/89
It was not until December 21, 1989, that the Council of Minis-
ters of the European Community finally adopted Regulation No.
4064/89.148 The Commission had four main reasons for wanting the
EC to adopt the Regulation. 49 First, the EC Commission believed
that achieving an integrated common market required exclusive juris-
diction over large European mergers with a so-called "Community
139. BEINERT, supra note 47, at 31.
140. Id.
141. Davidow, supra note 22, at 26.
142. Note that when the Member States adopted Regulation 4064/89, there was a com-
promise giving states the power to review transactions which had a significant national impact.
See infra notes 194-200 and accompanying text.
143. HAWK, supra note 122, at 910-11.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Otto Sandrock & Elke van Arnheim, New Merger Control Rules in the EEC, 25 INT'L
LAW. 859, 862 (1991).
147. Id. at 863.
148. Merger Control Regulation, supra note 34.
149. Philippe De Smedt & Georges Vandersanden, The EC Merger Control Regulation, 13
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 437, 440-41 (1990).
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dimension."' 50 Second, the Treaty of Rome did not provide adequate
procedures for merger evaluation. 51 The third reason for the Regula-
tion's adoption was the EC Commission's hope that a greater role in
Community affairs and a larger staff would increase its political
clout. 52 Finally, the Treaty of Rome lacked adequate antitrust
provisions. 1
53
Regardless of the Commission's motivations, the Merger Control
Regulation, which became effective on September 21, 1990, may have
created a much needed "level playing field" in the area of European
merger control law.154 This would be beneficial to foreign investors
and practitioners contemplating a large-scale merger. Instead of hav-
ing to research the possible effects of a merger and comply with often
strict controls of each affected nation (in this case the GWB), an in-
vestor would only have to follow the provisions of the EC Regulation.
1. Structural Threshold of the Regulation
As stated in Article 1(1), the Regulation applies to all concentra-
tions with a "Community dimension."' 55 This standard is met if the
aggregate world-wide turnover of all the undertakings concerned is
more than five billion ECU, 5 6 and the aggregate Community-wide
turnover of each of at least two undertakings concerned is more than
ECU 250 million. 57 Thus, the Regulation applies only to large merg-
ers. The Commission and Member States appear to have developed
this structural threshold on the premise that such transactions will
150. Id. The Commission was afraid that Member States with strict controls (e.g., Ger-
many) may block important mergers and acquisitions of European companies. Id.
151. Id. Under Article 86 of the Treaty of Rome, the EC Commission could only inter-
vene subsequent to the concentration. This "ex post facto" regulation created unneeded confu-
sion and uncertainty in the business community. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. Article 86 could not prevent two non-dominant companies from forming a mo-
nopoly. The Regulation, on the other hand, is aimed at preempting the "monopolization pro-
cess." Id.
154. Raoul-Duval & Nouel, supra note 113, at 455 ("[M]ergers falling within the Regula-
tion will be governed... by one set of rules.").
155. Merger Control Regulation, supra note 34, art. 1(1). The Commission recognizes a
concentration when: (1) two or more previously independent undertakings merge; or (2) one or
more persons already controlling at least one undertaking acquire direct or indirect control of
the whole or parts of one or more companies, whether by purchase of securities of assets, by
contract, or by other means. Id. art. 3(1).
156. Id. art. l(2)(a). An ECU (European Currency Unit) is an average of a bundle of
currencies. In 1989, one ECU equaled 1.10 United States dollars.
157. Id. art. 1(1). Aggregate turnover is the sum of the preceding fiscal year's sales less
sales rebates and turnover taxes. Id. art. 5(1).
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naturally have a community dimension. If possible, investors may
want to incorporate large firms in a transaction in order to reap the
benefits of "one-stop shopping."
2. Notification Requirements of the EC Regulation
Like the GWB, the EC law requires that parties provide ade-
quate notification.1 58 Parties must report concentrations of a commu-
nity dimension to the Commission not later than one week after the
earliest of the conclusion of the agreement, the announcement of the
public bid, or the acquisition of a controlling interest.1 59 If parties to
a concentration intentionally or negligently fail to fulfill this require-
ment, either by omitting any notification or supplying incorrect or
misleading information, the parties will be liable for fines of up to
ECU 50,000.160 This requirement, although strict, is similar to that in
most merger control regulations. Therefore, the notification require-
ment will probably not dissuade an eager investor from merging with
a German company. Furthermore, the requirement simplifies filing
for practitioners. Instead of possibly neglecting notification of af-
fected member states, one must only comply with the requirements
under the Regulation.
3. The EC Commission's Standard of Review
The Commission's standard for analyzing a proposed merger is
set forth in Article 2(3): "A concentration which creates or strength-
ens a dominant position as a result of which effective competition
would be significantly impeded in the common market or in a sub-
stantial part of it shall be declared incompatible with the common
market." 161 The Commission will initiate proceedings 162 if the con-
centration "raises serious doubts as to its compatibility with the com-
158. With concentrations having a community dimension, the Commission's role is similar
to that of the German FCO. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
159. Sandrock & van Arnheim, supra note 146, at 870. Note that this requirement differs
from the notification procedures of the GWB. See supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text.
160. Merger Control Regulation, supra note 34, art. 14(1).
161. Id. art. 2(3).
162. Id. art. 6(l)(c). The Commission may choose to suspend a concentration under Arti-
cle 7 and research its possible effects on the Community. van Empel, supra note 123, at 15-16.
The Commission may also grant derogations from the suspension "in order to prevent serious
damage to one or more of the undertakings concerned by a concentration or to a third party."
Id.
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mon market.' 163
The parties must wait three weeks after notifying the Commis-
sion before they may effect the merger. 64 The Commission may elect
to extend this suspension in order to review the concentration. 65 The
Commission will void any merger effected in violation of this rule,
and the parties may be subject to fines totalling up to ten percent of
their aggregate world-wide turnover. 166 The Commission will gener-
ally notify all interested parties of the initiation of proceedings within
one month, 167 enabling Member States to evaluate the proposed
merger and alleviating the enterprises of this responsibility.
During the appraisal process, the Commission determines
whether the parties to an undertaking have a "dominant position" in
the marketplace. 68 Any concentration that hinders effective competi-
tion will be declared incompatible with the Common Market. 69
Although the Commission has a list of criteria to determine whether a
merger is "compatible with the Common Market," it is unclear how
much weight the Commission assigns to each factor. 70 The factors
considered include: the market structure for the products and services
provided by the merging companies; the relative market position of
each party to the concentration; consumer interests; and legal
barriers. 
7 1
Practitioners may use these procedural hurdles as weapons in a
hostile takeover battle. 72 By persuading the Commission to tempo-
rarily suspend an acquisition, a vulnerable target may avoid a raider.
However, it must be noted that suspensions do not apply to mergers
involving securities. 173
163. Merger Control Regulation, supra note 34, art. 6(l)(c). The Commission, however,
does not further define or give criteria for "serious doubts." Davidow, supra note 22, at 30.
164. Sandrock & van Arnheim, supra note 146, at 870.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 170-71.
167. Merger Control Regulation, supra note 34, art. 10.
168. Sandrock & van Anheim, supra note 146, at 869.
169. Id. Merger Control Regulation, supra note 34, art. 2(3).
170. See Edward F. Glynn, Jr., An American Enforcer Looks at the EEC Merger Proposal,
59 ANTITRUST L.J. 237, 238 (1990).
171. Sandrock & van Arnheim, supra note 146, at 868-69.
172. van Empel, supra note 123, at 15.
173. Merger Control Regulation, supra note 34, art. 7(5). Suspensions under Article 7
"have no effect on the validity of transactions in securities ... which is regulated and super-
vised by authorities recognised by public bodies, operates regularly and is accessible directly or
indirectly to the public, unless the buyer and seller knew or ought to have known that the
transaction was carried out in contravention of paragraph I or 2." Id. (emphasis added).
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The Advisory Committee is comprised of representatives of the
Member States who are consulted before the Commission renders its
final decision. 17 4 The Commission will usually decide on the merger's
compatibility with the common market within four months,'"7 and
the parties may be heard "at every stage of the procedure up to the
consultation of the Advisory Committee."' 1 6 The Committee enables
the European nations to oversee the determinations of the Commis-
sion. This oversight benefits foreign investors by keeping the Member
States "at bay," making them less eager to demand that a proposed
merger be reviewed under national law.
4. The Reach of the EC Regulation
Similar to the "effects doctrine" of the GWB, the EC Regulation
may apply to mergers involving enterprises based in non-member
countries. 177 Community law will apply if "the companies participat-
ing in the concentration . . . have activities within the Community,
either through subsidiaries or through direct sales, and such activities
... [are] carried out in at least two member states."' 178 Although this
requirement may be burdensome for those developing a merger with-
out a European enterprise, parties need only refer to EC law and not
to the laws of Member Nations.
C. Relationship Between German and EC Merger Controls
Unfortunately for the practitioner, analyzing a merger's potential
effects on different markets may be time consuming and costly.
Under the Regulation, enterprises need only satisfy the Commission.
Because the Regulation provides for "one-stop shopping,"' 79 those
seeking to merge with German companies will attempt to fall within
the jurisdiction of the EC. Therefore, to minimize costs and delay,
practitioners must be aware of the parallel application of German and
Community law.
As discussed above, both Germany and the EC have broad juris-
174. Merger Control Regulation, supra note 34, art. 19(3). "An Advisory Committee on
concentrations shall be consulted before any decision is taken pursuant to Articles 8(2) to (5),
14 or 15, or any provisions are adopted pursuant to Article 23." Id.
175. Id. art. 10.
176. Id. art. 18.
177. Hirsch, supra note 37, at 27-28. See supra notes 95-101 and accompanying text.
178. Id.
179. See supra notes 139-41 and accompanying text.
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diction over mergers within and outside of Germany °80 and the EEC
respectively. 18 Because there are instances where both laws may ap-
ply, it is important that practitioners understand how to resolve a po-
tential conflict of laws.
Prior to the Regulation's enactment in 1989, the strict GWB
would have exclusively governed such a transaction. Today, the same
concentration may be reviewed by the EC Commission under the
more "merger friendly" EC Regulation. Therefore, the Regulation
may permit a once-restricted merger if the parties structure the deal
in order to fall within its purview.
1. Supremacy of EC Law
Since the signing of the Treaty of Rome, the Member States have
recognized that Community law has precedence over national laws.
18 2
As the European Court of Justice stated with regard to cartel law in
Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt, this principle of supremacy applies par-
ticularly to economic and corporate regulations.18 3 The Court held
that EC and national antitrust laws operate in "separate but parallel
spheres."18 4 Thus, national law should apply alongside EC law, and,
only where the two conflict, the Community law should supersede. 18 5
Under Article 21(2), national competition regulation should not
be applied to any undertaking with a "Community dimension."
1 86
The primary purpose of the Regulation is to give the European Com-
mission exclusive jurisdiction over large corporate mergers,18 7 while
small mergers continue to be governed by national law." 8 In most
situations, the Commission evaluates a proposed merger's "compati-
bility... with the common market."1 89 Under certain circumstances,
180. Heidenhain, supra note 61, § 36.01[2] (discussing the "effects doctrine" under the
GWB). See supra notes 177-78 and accompanying text.
181. See Hirsch, supra note 37 (discussing the "effects doctrine" under the EC Regula-
tion). See supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text.
182. See Case 106/77 Administration Des Finance De L'tat v. Simmenthal, 1978 E.C.R.
629, 644, 22-24, [1977-78 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) T 8476 (1978).
183. Case 14/68, 1969 E.C.R. 1, 14, 6, [1967-70 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 8056 (1969).
184. Sandrock & van Arnheim, supra note 146, at 872.
185. Hirsch, supra note 37, at 27-8, -9, -11.
186. Sandrock & van Arnheim, supra note 146, at 873.
187. Jim Evangelist, Toward a More Competitive Common Market: European Economic
Community Council Regulation No. 4064/89; On the Control of Corporate Mergers within the
European Community, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 457, 459 (1991).
188. Id.
189. Davidow, supra note 22, at 31.
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however, the Commission may refer the concentration to a member
state with a "distinct market interest."' 19
2. Parallel Application of German and EC Laws
German officials have expressed concern over the "one-stop
shopping" approach.191 Parallel application of both laws is still possi-
ble, however. There are in fact three instances which favor German
over EC merger control law. First, the Regulation only applies to
concentrations within the scope of Article 21(2).192 Therefore, any
undertaking without a "Community dimension" is covered by the
GWB. Second, Article 9193 embodies the "German clause."' 194 At the
request of German officials, the Commission will refer a notified con-
centration to the FCO. Such undertakings must threaten to create or
strengthen a dominant position in Germany in order to trigger the
notification requirement. EC officials regard this exemption as a com-
promise between the Commission's desire to have sole jurisdiction
over Community concentrations and the position of the member na-
tions to retain control over their own economies. 195 Germany, in par-
ticular, defended the GWB against the imposition of a system that
seemed to be unduly influenced by industrial policy considerations. 196
Article 21(3) provides the final exception to the Regulation's ex-
clusive application. 197 Where the Commission finds a concentration
to be compatible with the common market, the German government
may take appropriate measures to protect the nation's interests. 198
Legitimate interests include public security, plurality of the media,
and prudential concerns. 199 This provision clarifies that national in-
terests other than merger control objectives may override a decision
taken by the Commission. 200
190. Id. at 31-32.
191. See Trevor Soames, The Community Dimension in the EEC Merger Regulation: The
Calculation of the Turnover Criteria, 1990 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 213, 222 (1990).
192. Id.
193. Merger Control Regulation, supra note 34, art. 9.
194. BRI -rAN, supra note 3, at 39-40.
195. Davidow, supra note 22, at 19.
196. BRITTAN, supra note 3, at 40.
197. Id.
198. Merger Control Regulation, supra note 34, art. 21(3).
199. Sandrock & van Arnheim, supra note 146, at 874.
200. Id.
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IV. PRACTICAL EFFECTS AND CONSIDERATIONS
As the Common Market develops, the legal and business com-
munities will test the effectiveness of the EC Merger Control Regula-
tion. Certainly, the EC now has a modem, comprehensive and
effective procedure for regulating competition. Also, the new law
gives the EC Commission significant powers such as obtaining infor-
mation from parties, suspending transactions, and sanctioning
companies. 20'
One certain effect of the Regulation will be a stronger GWB.
There are two main reasons for this. First, the strict notification re-
quirements of the EC law will give the FCO timely and detailed infor-
mation. 202 Second, the "referral to national law" provision gives the
German government an active check on the EC Commission. 20
3
In coming years, the EC will undoubtedly try to lower the mone-
tary threshold of the Regulation. 204 This would give the Commission
increased control over European mergers at the expense of the Mem-
ber States. Although Germany will once again resist this effort, this
would be a positive change for foreign investors. Unlike the German
government, the EC would welcome an increase in European merger
activity (exemplified by the policies behind the Regulation).
20 5
European business leaders have predicted that the new Regula-
tion will lead to consolidation of large firms.206 This prediction for
drastic change is due to a number of reasons. First, American compa-
nies will be better able to compete with European firms with a
stronghold in the EC.20 7 Second, many companies previously con-
templating mergers with German companies may have resisted be-
cause of the strict GWB. 20 8 Third, the reunification of Germany has
created a number of new targets for acquisitions.209 Associated with
201. See Merger Control Regulation, supra note 34.
202. Id. art. 9. This is evidenced by Italy's development of a merger control package. See
generally Patrizio Bianchi & Giuseppina Gualtieri, Mergers and Acquisitions in Italy and the
Debate on Competition Policy, 34 ANTITRUST BULL. 601 (1989).
203. See supra notes 194-96 and accompanying text.
204. BRIrFAN, supra note 3, at 39.
205. Davidow, supra note 22, at 16. "The Directorate's reasoning [for an EC antitrust
merger control policy] started with the premise that Europe has had far too few mergers,
largely because various national laws and policies of the Member States hinder or prevent the
acquisition of domestic firms by foreign ones." Id.
206. See generally Fine, supra note 128.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
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this is the opportunity for American companies to position themselves
for entry into the Eastern European market. Finally, because the
Commission has an interest in large corporate mergers, it is likely that
it will review foreign investors more leniently.210
Scholars and practitioners have speculated that Member Nations
will try to seek exception from the Commission's authority whenever
possible. 21' The law is too young, however, to determine what will
happen. United States attorneys and entrepreneurs attempting to in-
volve themselves in European mergers must certainly become aware
of the applicable merger control laws. The new Regulation requires
large firms to constantly consider the EC ramifications of mergers,
joint ventures, and other similar transactions around the globe.21 2
Thus, those contemplating a merger must establish the influence of
the entities involved and should thoroughly research the laws of juris-
dictions in which the concentration will have an effect.
It appears that the EC adopted the Merger Regulation to protect
important mergers from the strict laws of some Member States, such
as Germany. This has set an important precedent that the European
market is dedicated to competition. Whether these policies, sup-
ported by the Regulation, will lead to increased efficiency and eco-
nomic growth is yet to be determined. Today, however, American
investors have a strong incentive to invest in previously restricted
large mergers with German companies.
Matthew C. McGrath*
210. Id. Review of the EC's policies shows that Community officials are willing to allow
firms to merge and grow to whatever size will make Europe more internationally competitive.
Therefore, the EC's strong competition policy should overcome German ideas of organic
growth and protectionism. Id.
211. Evangelist, supra note 187, at 459.
212. Paul D. Callister, The December 1989 European Community Merger Control Regula-
tion: A Non-EC Perspective, 24 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 97, 119 (1991).
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